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Abstract 
The research aims to understand how airlines make operative decisions on fares and frequencies of service in a competitive envi-
ronment. A game approach has been developed to model the airlines’ choices in a duopolistic market. In particular, the short haul 
market for intercity linkages has been investigated. In this segment the air mode is in competition with other ground modes (i.e. 
road and high speed rail). A bi-level optimization program has been realized. The variables of model are: fares and frequencies of 
airlines. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of paper is to develop a framework based on hierarchical optimization in order to understand how 
the airlines make their operative decisions on fares and frequencies of service in a multimodal competitive context. 
A game approach has been developed to model the airlines’ choices in a duopolistic market. In particular, the short 
haul market for intercity linkages has been investigated. In this segment the air mode is in competition with other 
ground modes (i.e. bus and high speed rail).  
A wide literature exists on the airlines’ competition and their strategic choices. Hansen (1990) developed a non-
cooperative game in which the airlines choose the frequencies of service, assuming fixed airfares and inelastic de-
mand. Hong and Harker (1992) developed a two-stage game for a slot allocation model. Dobson and Lederer (1993) 
studied the competitive choice of flight schedules and route prices by airlines operating in a single hub system. Ad-
ler (2001) analyzed airline profits based on profit maximization under deregulation and hub & spoke network. 
Takebayashi and Kanafani  (2005) studied network competition between hub & spoke airlines and point to point air-
lines by using a bilevel approach. Adler (2005) developed a framework to identify the most profitable hub & spoke 
networks. Adler and Smilowitz (2007) showed a game theoretic framework to analyse global alliances in air 
transport under competition. Wei and Hansen (2007) studied a game theoretic model to analyse airlines’ choices in 
duopoly markets on aircraft size and frequency of service. 
 
Corresponding author. Tel.: +3909123842413; fax: +39091423105. 
E-mail address: pietro.zito@unipa.it. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee. 
1877–0428 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.08.117
Pietro Zito et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 20 (2011) 1080–1089 1081
 Pietro Zito, Giuseppe Salvo, Luigi La Franca / Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 00 (2011) 000–000 
All these authors did not consider two important aspects:  
 the first is that, different classes of passenger should be taken into account. In this study, we distinguish two clas-
ses of consumers namely business and leisure passengers (each class of travellers presents different preferences); 
 whereas, the second concerns the competition with ground modes that is not considered. Here we consider all 
competitive transport modes for intercity linkages and elastic transport demand.  
Relatively few scientific contributes exist in literature on the competition between air and ground modes and in 
particular focusing on high speed rail. Janic (1993) developed a model of competition between two transport modes, 
concluding that high speed rail can be competitive with air mode for a large range of distance (from 400 km to 2000 
km). Mandel, et al. (1997) calibrated a cox-box logit choice model to forecast high speed rail demand. Adler et al. 
(2010) developed a methodology to assess infrastructures investments on transport sector taking into account com-
petition among different transport operators in a game theory framework. 
A program of bi-level optimization has been set up. The variables of model are: the fares and the frequencies of 
airlines. The upper level consists in maximizing an objective function that represents the profit of an airline  pro-
duced by difference between the revenue due to fares and cost to provide the service for a given frequency; under 
constrains of the satisfaction of the whole air travel demand, of the maximum number of flights and of the capacity 
of aircraft. Lower level describes the reaction function of users through by maximization of the user satisfaction 
(Ben Akiva et al., 1985). Therefore, if from the airline side, the firm seeks to maximize the profit, increasing fares 
and reducing frequencies. From the other side, users (passengers) want to minimize their generalized travel cost (re-
ducing fares and increasing frequency of flights). Thus, an optimal fare and scheduled frequency will be such that 
fare and frequency levels are not too high (otherwise in the former, users would be deterred by using the air mode 
and in the latter, airline might  not cover service costs) and still generating enough revenue. An important feature of 
this problem, and more generally of bi-level programs, is the hierarchical relationship between two conflictual deci-
sion makers: airline and passenger (Colson et al., 2007).  
In this framework, a game theory approach has been developed in order to simulate the airlines’ behaviour in the 
same network with competitive modal alternatives. Thus an original approach has been used to model operative 
choices of airlines. The game is a one shot simultaneous game. Two airlines, on each intercity link, choose the fare 
and the frequency of service at the same time, assuming that other airline will have a fixed choice once that its 
choice is made. Both airlines know all the available choices of each other as well as the payoffs (profit of firms) 
from each combination of choices, assuming complete information. This assumption is guaranteed by definition of a 
same market share function for both airlines. This function is a nested logit model with attributes: the travel time, 
the air fare and the service frequency. The passenger (that has previously chosen to travel by air mode) will choose 
the alternative (airline 1 or 2) that maximize his/her utility function in term of air fare and service frequency of each 
airline. A traveller is assumed for each class (business, leisure) to choose the travel alternative (mode and route) 
which yields the highest utility. Finally only few papers show the existence of a Nash equilibrium, conversely for a 
given air network we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium and some its interesting characteristics.  
The paper is so structured: Section 2 describes the market share function, Section 3 shows the bi-level optimiza-
tion model and the assumptions considered; Section 4 shows the outcomes of simulations; and finally Conclusions 
are summarized.  
2. Market share function 
The market share function allows to passenger to choose among available competitive transport alternatives, re-
acting so to the choices of the transport operator. A nested multinomial discrete choice model has been used in order 
to model the modal/route choice (air mode versus ground modes), considering as competitive alternatives: air, high 
speed rail and bus; and as attributes: the total travel cost, the total travel time and the service frequency. This model 
allows to simulate the choice behaviour of passengers in term of fares and service frequency supplied in general by a 
transport operator and in particular by airlines. The passengers’ elasticity for any attribute has been derived by pre-
vious studies (Mandel, et al. 1997, Adler, et al. 2010 ) and adjusted for Italian context of intercity linkages (i.e. Mi-
lan – Rome), by using generalized least squares technique (Cascetta, 2001). For sake of notice, the passenger first 
chooses the modal alternative (air, high speed rail and bus) based on perceived generalized costs. Secondly, air pas-
sengers are split between two airlines in according to the air fare and the service frequency of each airline.  The 
choices tree of the transport demand model is showed in figure 1 and it should be noted that the traveller can choose 
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also the no-travel alternative (NT). Further, the inclusion of the no-travel alternative captures the price elasticity of 
the whole demand and allows airline fares not too high (Hong and Harker, 1992).          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The choices tree of the transport demand model. 
 
Thus, the passenger chooses an transport alternative that produces the highest utility, based on the total travel cost 
(the cost of the ticket adding access/egress costs by ground modes), the total travel time (for each origin destination 
relation, we consider the trip time, the takeoff/landing time, the time spent at the airport/station and the access/egress 
time to the airport/station) and the logarithm of the service’s frequency for all alternative modes. The logarithmic 
form of the frequency is preferable because one would expect diminishing returns with respect to the gain in service 
attractiveness from adding an additional flight. The direct service alternatives can be considered as aggregations of 
more specific alternatives corresponding to specific flights. Thus, the frequency is a measure of the “size” of an al-
ternative that is better represented in logarithmic form (Ben Akiva et al., 1985). Furthermore it is reasonable to as-
sume that the marginal benefit achieved by the increase in frequency tends to decrease for increasing frequencies 
(Hansen, 1990). 
Let Vijsm be the systematic utility for travelling from city i to city j, traveller type s and mode m = 1,..,4 (for road, 
rail, no-travel and air mode); Cijs m the total travel cost from city i to city j traveller type s and mode m = 1,..,4; Nijs m 
the frequency of service from city i to city j traveller type s and mode m = 1,..,4; TTijs m the total travel time from city 
i to city j traveller type s and mode m = 1,..,4; 1s, 2s, 3s and   adjusted parameters of model (reported in appendix 
A). The systematic utilities include the specific attribute of the alternative (ASA) for all alternatives less one and are 
expressed as follows: 
  
The market share function for the airline x, from city i to city j and traveller type s is expressed as follows (Ben-
Akiva and Lerman, 1985): 
 
The first term is the conditional probability of traveller type s choosing airline x = 1, 2, given the choice of air 
mode; whereas the second term is the probability of traveller type s choosing air mode. 
 
 
 
 
NT Road HS Rail 
Airline 1 Airline 2 
 
0
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3. Bi-level optimization model 
In the model, there are two players: the airline 1 and 2; each player has two decision variables: the air fare and the 
service frequency, and the objective of the player is to maximize own profit. We assume the complete information in 
the decision making process of airlines based on its information and competitor ones. The one-shot simultaneous 
game model has one period and two airlines, in the network, choose the air fare and the service frequency at the 
same time for each intercity link. We focus on pure strategies of the game and try to find a Nash equilibrium (NE) 
for the game, which is defined as a set of strategies chosen by each player in the game, where no player has the in-
centive to change their own strategy given the strategy of other players. In a Nash non-cooperative game, the equi-
librium state is characterized by the property that neither player can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his 
decision (Fisk, 1984).  
The main assumptions can be so summarized: 
 the airlines behave in a non-cooperative manner in which each airline takes as given the other airlines’ operative 
decisions when deciding upon its own strategy; 
 the airlines operates at least one flight on all of its routes; 
 the airlines choose aircraft of sufficient size; 
 the passengers, in choosing their routes, assume to consider only non-stop and one-stop for air service.  
Let x  be the profit of airline x; ijs the whole number of passengers of the class s that would want to travel from 
city i to city j; Cijsx the air fare for the airline x, from city i to city j and traveller type s; Txijk the cost function of flight 
for airline x; Nxijk the service frequency for airline x;  k the type of aircraft (with different capacity: number of avail-
able seats); n*xijk the load factor; Axk the aircraft number of type k; uxk the maximum number of daily rotations for air-
craft of type k; txijk the flight time for aircraft of type k. The cost of flight for short-haul air market is calculated by 
this expression (Swan and Adler, 2006):  
where Dij is the trip distance from airport of city i to airport of city j, Sxk is the number of available seats for airline x 
a aircraft type k. The values in equation (8) have been multiplied by 2.2 in order to transform the dollar values in eu-
ro and to reflect general administrative overheads and commission (Adler et al., 2010).   
Then the mathematical formulation of bi-level optimization model for airline x is described as follows: 
 
In the upper level (eq. 9), the airline x1,2 seeks to maximize the profit x achieved by the difference between 
the revenue due to the air fare and the cost to provide the service for a given frequency; under two constrains (eq. 
10): the former is the satisfaction of the whole air travel demand, and the latter is that, the maximum number of fea-
sible flights must be more than product of the flight time for the service frequency. Lower level (eq. 11) describes 
the user reaction function by the maximization of user satisfaction w or the total consumer surplus (maximum ex-
pected utility expressed in monetary terms, Ben-Akiva et al., 1985, Adler et al., 2010). Therefore, if from the airline 
side, the firm seeks to maximize the profit, increasing fares and reducing frequencies. From the other side, users 
(passengers) want to minimize their generalized travel cost (reducing fares and increasing frequency of flights). 
Thus, an optimal fare and scheduled frequency will be such that fare and frequency levels are not too high (other-
wise in the former case, users would be deterred by using the air mode and in the latter case, airline might not cover 
service costs) and still generating enough revenue.  
Hong and Harker (1992) argued about the conditions of the existence of a Nash equilibrium; affirming that suffi-
cient condition for the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium is that the strategies set of each player has 
to be bounded, convex and closed, that the payoff function for each player has to be concave with respect to player’s 
strategy set and the gradient of the objective function of the airline profit () is a continuously differentiable and 
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strictly monotone function; and this happens for our case. Furthermore in the equilibrium state, we can affirm that, 
on each given intercity link, the service frequencies as well as the air fares of airlines are directly proportional to the 
respective airlines market shares (the conditional probability of travellers  of choosing an airline, given the choice of 
air mode) and inversely proportional to the flight costs, considering an unique type of aircraft for the airline operat-
ing on air link (see appendix B).  
4. Simulation and results 
The bi-level optimization model has been implemented in GAMS software, using MPEC solver. The parameters 
of model are reported in appendix A. The analysis has been limited to an intercity link Rome – Milan and vice versa. 
Nevertheless the analysis can be extended to any air network however connected. Furthermore a parametric analysis 
has been carried out in order to test the model behaviour. We have also considered a weighted average of airfares 
based on traveller’s type s. The first analysis is characterized by a fixed airfare of airline 2 and varying the airfare of 
airline 1 from 60 € to 90 € with a step of 10 €; the simulation model determines the service frequencies for both air-
lines N1 and N2. In this case the model behaves as one shot Cournot game. Figures 2 and 3 report the service fre-
quencies and profit of airlines respectively. It should be noted that the airline 1 has a competitive advantage in term 
of frequency and travelled passengers up to when the airfare of the airline 1 is less than the airfare of the airline 2; 
whereas the situation changes for an airfare of the airline 1 greater than the airfare of the airline 2. The profit of the 
airline 1 increases for an airfare less than the airfare of the airline 2, reaching a maximum for an airfare of  80 € for 
both airlines; after this  value the airline 2 increases its own profit. For increasing airfares greater than 110€ the fre-
quency as well as profit decrease quickly because travelers choose other cheaper transport modes, rather than air 
mode. 
The second analysis is characterized by a fixed service frequency of the airline 2, varying the service frequency 
of the airline 1 from 2 to 12; the simulation model determines the airfare for both airlines C1 and C2. In this case the 
model behaves as one shot Beltrand game. Figures 4 and 5 show the airfares and the profit of airlines respectively in 
term of the service frequency of the airline 1. It should be noted that the airfare for both airlines decreases up to 
reach a minimum; after the airfare increases in order to cover the major cost to provide air service for a given fre-
quency. The profit of the airline 2 decreases whereas that of the airline 1 increases since passengers choose this air-
line for increasing service frequencies.   
The third analysis concerns the comparison between the monopoly and the duopoly reported in table 1. As ex-
pected in monopoly regime, the airfares are higher than in competition regime as well as consumer surplus is less 
than in competition regime. Finally we have also simulated the behaviour of airlines, varying exogenously the high 
speed train fares (fig. 6 and 7); for increasing fares of this last, airfares increase well as, but slowly up to reach a sat-
uration value keeping the service frequency constant, as well as the  profit of airlines because of an increased gain 
margin of airlines due to higher rail fares. Obviously, this gain decreases for increasing airfares, since travellers 
choose other cheaper transport modes or no travel.             
 
Figure 2 Cournot game, service frequencies in term of airfare. 
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Figure 3 Cournot game, profits in term of airfare. 
 
Figure 4 Beltrand game, airfares in term of service frequency. 
 
Figure 5 Beltrand game, profits in term of service frequency. 
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Table 1 Simulation results. 
 
Airline 1 Airline 2 
Consumer Surplus 
 
C1 Business C1 Leisure N1 Profit1 C2 Business C2 Leisure N2 Profit2 
Monopoly 135 € 70 € 23 1,13*106 € - - - - 4,89 € 
Duopoly 129 € 62 € 12 5,23*105 € 111 € 54 € 12 3,83*105 € 5,53 € 
 
 
Figure 6 Airfares in term of high speed rail fares. 
 
Figure 7 Airline profits in term of high speed rail fares. 
5. Conclusion 
A bi-level optimization program has been set up in order to better explain operative decisions on fares and fre-
quencies of service in a competitive environment. A game approach has been developed to model airlines’ choices 
in duopoly market. The basic idea of our work is focused on how the airlines take their operating decisions in a 
competitive context. Thus for this task, the ground transport operators do not take part in the one-shot simultaneous 
game. 
The main conclusions can be so summarized: 
1. The bi-level models simulate better the interactions between the airline (leader) and travellers (followers); 
2. The reaction of the users (followers) is simulated through the level of user satisfaction or total consumer sur-
plus (expressed in monetary terms); 
3. As expected in monopoly regime, the service frequencies are lower, the airfares are higher, user satisfaction is 
lower and profit is higher than in air competition regime. 
4. In the equilibrium state, the service frequencies as well as air fares of airlines are directly proportional to the 
airlines’ market shares and inversely proportional to the flight costs. 
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5. From a side, the competition with ground modes and in particular with high speed railway bounds the growth 
of airfares, since it do not allow to have airfare too high (an increasing number of travelers decides to use al-
ternative transport modes or no travel), from the other side, the profit of airlines increases for higher rail fares.  
Finally, future directions of research will be developed toward a complete framework game based, whose players 
are all transport operators, taking part at the game on an integrated transport network.  
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Appendix A. Main parameters of model 
The parameters used for simulations are in part empirical data coming from previous studies others have been ad-
justed for Italian context. The passengers’ elasticity for any attribute has been derived by previous studies (Mandel, 
et al. 1997, Adler, et al. 2010 ) and adjusted for Italian context of intercity linkages (i.e. Milan – Rome), by using 
generalized least squares technique (Cascetta, 2001). Technical parameters as n*xijk the load factor, Axk the aircraft 
number of type k, uxk the maximum number of daily rotations have been selected by authors. 
Table 2  Main parameters of model. 
Parameter Value for 
business 
Value for 
Leisure 
1s -0.04 -0.10 
2s +1.16  +0.89 
3s -0.15  -0.02  
 +0.65 +0.65 
ASANT -0.95 -0.95 
ASArail -1.75 -1.75 
ASAroad -1.50 -1.50 
ASAairline1 +1.00 +1.00 
ijs  106551 M-R 
101571 R-M 
45661 M-R 
43531 R-M 
n*xijk 0.80 
Axk 6 
uxk 4 
Sxk 320 A320 
140 MD80 
Appendix B. The equilibrium solution  
The equilibrium solution is the point at which the optimality conditions for eq. (9) are satisfied simultaneously 
for x = 1, 2. 
 
We assume to consider one unique type of aircraft that flies on a given intercity link, for each airline and also 
without lost of generality we omit indexes i, j and s simplifying so the mathematical notation. The partial differentia-
tion of the market share function in term of air fare and service frequency respectively of airline x, after simple 
mathematical calculation, is expressed as follows:  
 
1
 Data source for the transport demand split for leisure and business travelers is Adler, 2005. 
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Thus for the determination of equilibrium point is achieved by solution of following mathematical system of non-
linear equations: 
 
Therefore explicating C1 and C2 and substituting, we achieve: 
 
Considering that the term (1- Pairline x/air) much greater than   Pairline x/air (1-Pair) << 1 and thus we can consider 
negligible the last term, obtaining the following equilibrium solutions: 
 
Assuming that T1 T2  N1/N2  C1/C2. 
 
